Executive summary

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Executive summary

In May 2016, representatives from 18 donor countries and 16 aid organisations (including the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement (RCRCM) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) agreed a ‘Grand Bargain’ outlining 51 separate commitments to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international humanitarian aid. These entities agreed to a voluntary self-reporting mechanism, supported by an annual independent report, in order to measure their collective progress against the agreed commitments.

The second annual independent report, conducted by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI and published in June 2018, concluded that, based on available evidence, there had been important progress in 2017 in a number of workstreams, and some progress in integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue. However, the report also identified a number of major challenges to further progress, and outlined six areas of action intended to address them, including: the need to rationalise and prioritise the commitments, targeting efforts towards those that might bring the greatest rewards; the need to reduce the significant bureaucratic burden on signatories; and the need to increase mutual trust and confidence to enable the better functioning of the quid pro quo – an arrangement between the constituent groups of signatories in which each committed to deliver on a set of actions that, taken together, would bring about system-wide change.

The present report is the third annual independent review of the collective progress made by the signatories to the Grand Bargain against their commitments. Commissioned by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) on behalf of the Facilitation Group (FG), it covers the period January to December 2018. The primary data source for this review were the self-reports submitted by 52 of the 59 signatories in 2018, and bilateral, semi-structured interviews with 50 of these signatories. Additional data was collated through narrative reports submitted by the co-conveners of six workstreams, bilateral research interviews with at least one co-convener for each of the eight remaining workstreams, semi-structured research interviews with 38 individuals from non-signatory organisations and a comprehensive review of relevant grey and published literature.

At the direction of the Eminent Person and the FG, signatories were asked to report in more detail than in previous years, with specific indicators provided for reporting against 11 ‘core commitments’ agreed in September 2018; on efforts to integrate gender equality and women’s empowerment across the Grand Bargain; and with a specific emphasis on reporting results achieved, not just actions taken or planned.

Key areas of progress

Responding to the conclusions of the second annual report and discussions at the annual meeting of Grand Bargain signatories in June 2018, the Eminent Person, with support from a strengthened FG, outlined steps to streamline the structures of the Grand Bargain and provide a clearer focus for collective efforts. This resulted in the merging of two workstreams, the articulation of a set of 11 core commitments, drawn from the original 51, that signatories agreed were likely to bring the greatest dividends in terms of transforming the humanitarian aid system, a more robust role for the FG and a results-focused approach to reporting.

On a substantive level, much has been achieved by the signatories in 2018. The self-reports evidence increased activity by signatories across the 51 commitments, with on average 68% of signatories reporting activities against the commitments relevant to them, compared to 52% in 2017. Workstream 3 (Cash programming) was again the standout in terms of performance and overall progress. The workstream was highly active as a coordinating body under the leadership of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Kingdom, with clear and actionable priorities agreed, a strong collaborative approach, with different signatories taking the lead on specific actions, and targeted efforts to address areas that received less attention in 2017, including gender equality and women’s empowerment. While cash programming was building momentum prior to the
establishment of the Grand Bargain, the initiative has provided a valuable platform for coordinating and consolidating efforts between donors, the UN, NGOs and the RCRCM, contributing to a normative and operational shift towards more routine use of cash programming in humanitarian settings.

Workstream 2 (Localisation) also performed well. The co-conveners (Switzerland and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)) expended particular efforts in moving the workstream from dialogue on definitions to actioning the commitments. The workstream identified and delivered against a series of priority actions, including field missions and exchanges of lessons and good practice. Under this workstream, the Grand Bargain has established localisation as a key normative principle of humanitarian action. While there has as yet been no system-wide shift in operational practice, the evidence indicates that the Grand Bargain has helped to drive progress, providing incentives for and facilitating sharing lessons and experiences on implementing a localisation approach.

Workstream 9 (Harmonised reporting) continued to make good progress in 2018. There was a clear focus on rolling out the 8+3 harmonised reporting template at country level, making adjustments in response to the interim assessment of the pilot and successfully advocating for increased take-up of the template among signatories. The co-conveners (the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Germany), together with participating signatories, have had substantial success in testing the challenging premise that a single, simplified reporting template could be accepted and used by a range of donors and aid organisations.

While not a top performer in terms of overall progress, workstream 5 (Needs assessments) was identified by many signatories as having improved substantially as a coordinating mechanism compared to 2017. Responding to criticisms outlined in the second annual independent report, the co-conveners (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)), with the political support of the Eminent Person, stepped up efforts to address the low levels of trust between signatories on this subject, advocated with some success for their increased engagement and made substantive progress in key technical areas, including on joint analysis and beginning to identify good practice and lessons learned on collaboration with development partners.

As identified in the second annual independent report, there are common enablers of progress in these workstreams: each set of co-conveners has created, with support from signatories, an active forum with good collaboration between constituent groups, focused around clear actionable priorities. The investments required of co-convening institutions in terms of staff time and capacities in order to make these fora successful have been considerable.

Available data also evidenced good progress by individual signatories or small groups of signatories against specific commitments. More signatories than in 2017 reported data on funding passed to local and national partners, with seven reporting that they had met or exceeded the 25% target, compared to five in 2017 (core commitment 2.4).

Core commitment 3.1+3.6 (Increase the routine use of cash) also saw increased activity, with a large number of signatories reporting increases in the volume of cash being programmed at country level and some reporting institutional policy shifts towards cash as the preferred modality (unless contextual conditions precluded it). Individually, signatories also made good progress against commitment 4.1 (Reduce the costs and measure the gained efficiencies of delivering assistance with technology), with specific examples of measurable efficiencies.

One of the most notable areas of progress was against core commitment 7.1a (Increase multi-year collaborative and flexible planning and multi-year funding), with 78% of donors reporting that they had maintained or increased their multi-year funding in 2018, including five donors who increased the share of their overall humanitarian funding that was multi-year to over 50% (the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada and Germany), and two, Sweden and Norway, providing four-year agreements for unearmarked core funds to WFP, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Further progress by the two largest donors, ECHO and the United States, could tip progress on this core commitment into a system-wide shift that would transform the funding environment for humanitarian aid.

There is evidence of signatories making connections across thematic areas and workstreams, including in relation to cash programming and social protection (workstreams 3 and 10). There were numerous positive examples of collaboration between donors and aid organisations on key themes, including
localisation and the participation revolution (workstream 6). Several signatories reported on their efforts to navigate or mitigate the challenges they face in fulfilling some of their commitments. A number of donors explained that they are actively looking for ways to support their partners’ investments in innovations and technology to increase operational efficiency, and many are seeking ways to increase the share of humanitarian funds that local and national responders can access, including through pooled funds and single intermediaries. A number of aid organisations have invested substantial resources in publishing their funding data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard, despite ongoing concerns about the appropriateness of this system.

There was also notable progress at country level. In relation to joint analysis and planning with development actors (commitments 5.7, 7.3 and 10.4), six UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) worked together to develop collective outcomes based on analyses of risks and vulnerabilities. More than half of all HCTs now have multi-year plans in place (core commitment 7.1a). Workstreams 2, (Localisation), 3 (Cash programming), 5 (Needs assessments) and 9 (Harmonised reporting) all undertook targeted engagement with colleagues and other stakeholders at country level through field missions and/or rolling out specific approaches or pilots. Signatories’ self-reports indicated an array of country-level initiatives and results in relation to many of the commitments and workstream areas, particularly localisation, cash programming, the participation revolution, multi-year planning and the humanitarian–development nexus. In Bangladesh, Lebanon, Somalia and elsewhere, national and local actors are showing more interest in and awareness of the Grand Bargain, and actively seeking ways to use the framework to improve international humanitarian response in their countries and negotiate a better relationship for themselves with international humanitarian actors.

In terms of gender, self-reports indicated an impressive breadth and depth of actions being undertaken by signatories from all constituent groups to integrate considerations of gender equality and women’s empowerment across the Grand Bargain framework. Signatories generally sought to apply, de facto, their pre-existing pledges on gender (including Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and ECHO gender and age markers) to the Grand Bargain commitments, with a focus on localisation (workstream 2), cash programming (workstream 3), needs assessments (workstream 5) and, to a lesser extent, the participation revolution (workstream 6) and enhanced engagement between humanitarian and development actors (workstream 10).

Remaining challenges and the impact on collective progress

Notwithstanding areas of substantial progress, many of the challenges to further and speedier progress identified in the second annual independent report persist. The diversity of effort among signatories and between workstreams is still stark, with great disparities in the levels of investment being made, and the results being achieved. Some of the practical challenges identified in the last annual report remain, including the sheer breadth and scope of the commitments and the lack of clarity in the original wording of many of them. In 2018, aid organisations highlighted in particular that the changes to policy and practice required to fulfil some commitments were significant, representing major institutional investment at all levels, including the allocation of staff and financial resources.

Despite efforts to streamline the framework and adopt a clearer focus in the fourth quarter of 2018, the Grand Bargain remained both over-structured and under-governed, creating an unnecessary burden on signatories to engage, but without clear leadership on where their collective efforts are heading. The identification of core commitments was intended to provide a focus for and consolidation of collective efforts, but it is too early to assess what impact this new focus will have, and signatories were still proceeding at their own pace, working to their own priorities and, in some areas, in their own directions. While there is more data on results in this year’s reporting process, this is still limited, and it is difficult to accurately assess or clearly quantify what tangible progress is being made across the commitments. Communication between workstreams, between the FG and co-conveners and between them and the wider group of signatories remains poor. Signatories that are not co-convenors or members of the FG struggle to find out what is happening outside of the workstreams they regularly engage with, and have no access to or influence over the ‘bigger picture’.

Crucially, workstreams continued to work in silos, with little or no substantive dialogue between different co-conveners on specific or general cross-cutting
themes, and even the most active workstreams were still focused primarily on technical issues. Sherpa-level engagement has been limited, and political-level dialogue between the signatories – or even within a core group of signatories – has been largely absent. The major challenges to greater and speedier progress remain political, and the technical solutions that many signatories and workstreams have focused on to date are unlikely to have much impact in this respect. The Eminent Person led high-level dialogue in late 2018 aimed at addressing political obstacles to progress on joint needs assessments/analysis and on improved risk-sharing. Despite some impact, it is clear that much greater, more consistent and more constructive dialogue is required on these and other issues, including the impact of domestic politics on donors’ risk tolerance, on increasing the transparency of aid expenditures down the chain, on identifying and addressing the barriers to more flexible funding and on reducing or mitigating the impact of reporting or compliance requirements – all issues that are undermining the spirit of collaboration that the Grand Bargain was built upon, and upon which the successful transformation of the international humanitarian aid system depends.

Key questions regarding the future of the Grand Bargain that were highlighted in the second annual independent report, specifically how it should evolve, adapt, be further streamlined or even when it will ‘conclude’, have remained unanswered. There is still no clear deadline for achieving the goals that were originally set, no targets to clarify what achieving those goals would look like and few targets or deadlines for individual commitments. Some signatories felt that there was still insufficient clarity or detail on the ‘vision’ that the Grand Bargain was trying to achieve. Without clarification in this respect, it is hard to see how the requisite motivation can be fully harnessed to drive forward progress.

More broadly, there are growing concerns among signatories across all constituent groups regarding the high transaction costs associated with implementing the Grand Bargain. Signatories again highlighted the heavy bureaucratic burden, the wealth of workstream discussions and initiatives to follow and the sheer breadth of the commitments and actions required to fulfil them as all requiring major institutional investment. Absent a more tangible demonstration of returns on these investments, particularly evidence of movement on some of the major political issues that are stalling greater progress, it is likely that enthusiasm will start to wane.

Conclusions and recommendations

Three years into the process, the Grand Bargain continues to attract substantial institutional investments from most signatories, many of whom have dedicated staff/staff time, integrated the concept and the commitments into corporate strategies and policies and used the framework to shape institutional practice. Signatories continue to see the potential of the Grand Bargain as a lever for change, to resolve or successfully navigate longstanding challenges and to increase system-wide efficiency and effectiveness. The sense of pessimism evident during the consultations in 2017 seems to have abated, at least to some extent.

There is general consensus that the potential of the Grand Bargain has yet to be realised, and that the investments made thus far need to be sustained for at least a further two-three years before returns will be fully apparent. Even so, there is evidence that these investments are starting to bring dividends, including contributing to the normative and operational shift to use of cash programming, driving a normative shift towards localisation, bringing about significant increases in the volume of multi-year funding available and successfully testing the idea of a harmonised reporting format. But despite the articulation of collective priorities, a more streamlined structure and a results-focused reporting approach, further efforts to address the underlying problems in the structure, vision and focus of the Grand Bargain are required to ensure that it can deliver on its original promise.

There is evidence that such efforts are possible – that the Grand Bargain can evolve and adapt. The agreements reached on collective priorities, including within and across workstreams; the growing interest in and use of the Grand Bargain at country level; and the use of the Grand Bargain to push ahead on pre-existing commitments on gender equality and women’s empowerment all indicate that it is to an extent already evolving, albeit organically and without a clear vision. Slavish adherence to the original package of 51 commitments, with its vast array of themes, often vague wording and lack of actionable commitments, is, in the opinion of the authors, unlikely to bring about the results the original group of signatories were aiming for. Instead, adopting a purposefully iterative approach, reflecting on learning thus far in order to further consolidate efforts and reduce bureaucracy, may help ensure that the potential of the Grand Bargain is realised.

The research undertaken for this third annual independent report shows that the Grand Bargain
still has added value. It is proving effective in driving forward major changes in policy and practice on localisation and on multi-year funding and is supporting wider efforts to change policy and practice on cash programming. It provides a unique platform for strategic dialogue between donors, UN entities, NGOs and the RCRCM – a platform which does not exist elsewhere within the aid system. It is difficult to estimate the likely impact of a failure to achieve, at least in part, the original ambitions of the Grand Bargain, but abandoning the significant political, financial and institutional investments made by such a broad array of signatories thus far would likely undermine the sense of collective purpose that the initiative has generated, and which is necessary to achieve the system-wide improvements to humanitarian action that are so urgently needed. Improper as it may be, the Grand Bargain is probably the best vehicle currently available to bring about the kind of transformative change to the humanitarian sector that donors and aid organisations are striving for. Realising these ambitions will require greater and more sustained political investment from all signatories, under the direction of the new Eminent Person, to tackle the longstanding and complex challenges that continue to stall progress.

While acknowledging the efforts expended by the outgoing Eminent Person, the FG, co-conveners and the wider group of signatories to implement the recommendations of the second annual independent report, a number of the recommendations made in 2018 remain valid today. The following are highlighted as particular priorities for action – both substantive and procedural – which could help harness the momentum built over the last three years and realise the ambitions of the Grand Bargain.

1. Adopt a strategic approach to mitigate remaining challenges and maximise opportunities to make greater progress

Action: Under the leadership of the Eminent Person, the signatories should come together at the annual meeting to identify where progress is stalling, what factors are responsible for this and what actions or investments are necessary to overcome, navigate or mitigate those factors, and how to consolidate and simplify efforts to achieve these aims. This discussion at the annual meeting should provide the outline of a collective strategy to build on progress already made, including capitalising on the growing momentum at country level. This process should also outline delegated responsibilities for actions agreed as part of the strategy.

2. Undertake concerted high-level political dialogue aimed at better navigating or mitigating challenges to success

Action: The FG and co-conveners, with support from the Secretariat, should identify the political issues that are retarding progress within and across workstreams to inform discussions on the development of a strategy at the annual meeting. The present report can serve as a basis for this analysis, with particular focus on issues such as: what a more qualitative approach to supporting local and national responders should look like (i.e. going beyond increased access to funding); how best to reduce the impact of low risk tolerance among donor countries, and how to mitigate the related impact on aid organisations of increased compliance requirements; where the barriers are to scaling up flexible funding and how to use the different levels of ‘flexibility’ that already exist more strategically to address gaps and better support priorities; and how to ensure that aid organisations’ efforts to enhance needs assessments and analysis will result in more principled allocations of funding by donors.

Action: The FG and co-conveners should undertake a series of ‘deep dive’ analyses to inform a more in-depth understanding of and dialogue on the key political obstacles to further progress, including on those issues listed above.

3. Define more clearly what the ‘success’ of the Grand Bargain will look like

Action: The original ambitions of the Grand Bargain were ‘transformative’ in nature. While these ambitions should be retained, they should also be examined with a critical eye to see what can reasonably be achieved in the next few years, paying due regard to how the framework has already evolved over time, and how the politics of the global aid environment have changed since 2016. This analysis should inform the strategy recommended above (see Recommendation 1).

Action: A review of the indicators for some of the core commitments should be undertaken and adjustments made to ensure that they are practical (i.e. signatories can report against them), pragmatic (i.e. signatories can access this data without investing in new, heavy data collection exercises) and useful (i.e. the data collated can be used to develop a reasonable overview of collective progress). This process should aim to simplify, not further complicate, current discussions on measuring ‘progress’. The authors recommend in particular a review of the indicators for core
commitments 2.4, 4.5, 6.1, 7.1a, 9.1 and 10.4 in order to provide greater clarity on how/what data should be reported or adjustments made to ensure each indicator is practical, pragmatic and useful in terms of being able to actually measure substantive progress.

**Action:** A more comprehensive review should be planned for 2021, marking five years since the Grand Bargain was initiated. This review should be based on a series of practical and pragmatic quantitative and qualitative points of analysis (e.g. funding trends, pre-existing targets embedded in certain commitments, Ground Truth Solutions or other perception surveys) that can provide a reasonable assessment of progress made against the original goals the Grand Bargain was created to achieve. The review should draw from the evidence presented in the annual independent reports prepared since 2017 and should provide the basis for decision-making on the future of the Grand Bargain initiative. Given the scope and depth of changes envisaged by the original signatory group, any such decisions made earlier are unlikely to benefit from or be informed by an appropriate understanding of whether the Grand Bargain has achieved its original goals.

4. Get the bargain back on track

**Action:** Signatories should design and institute appropriate incentives for actions to fulfil the commitments. In current discourse this has focused primarily on donors incentivising action by aid organisations, but this should be a mutual approach, recognising that all signatories may need incentives to make the substantial changes in policy and practice required. Key incentives for aid organisations include funding conditions or making funding available for specific actions. Incentives for donors may include increased visibility in domestic and international public discourse, use of ‘good donor’ ranking systems, increased access to substantive or technical discussions among aid organisations and characterising actions as ‘global public goods’.

**Action:** Building on the initiative put forward by the Netherlands and the ICRC, signatories should work together to understand the risks that different constituent groups face in taking actions or not taking actions towards their commitments, and how respective efforts to mitigate risks may impact – positively and negatively – on other constituent groups.

5. Consolidate efforts in order to lighten the bureaucratic burden and better support implementation of the commitments

**Action:** The FG, in full consultation with the co-conveners, should consider ways to break down the silos between workstreams, with a view to further consolidating and sequencing efforts and reducing duplication. For example, greater synchronicity of efforts between workstream 7+8 (Enhanced quality funding) and workstream 5 (Needs assessments) could enable greater alignment of multi-year funding for multi-year plans (commitment 7.2), with shared outcomes between humanitarian and development actors (commitment 10.4) that are in turn based on shared needs and vulnerability analyses (commitment 5.7). Strategic collaboration between workstreams 4, 7+8 and 9 could also ensure a more holistic approach to enhancing the quality of funding (commitments 7.1a and 8.2/8.5), while reducing or mitigating the impact of compliance requirements through harmonising and simplifying donor reporting requirements (commitments 4.5 and 9.1).

6. Empower existing governance structures to deliver

**Action:** The capacities of the FG should be reinforced, with a greater understanding among member institutions of the nature of the work and resources required to fulfil this role (e.g. staff time); with a biennial rather than annual term, to ensure greater continuity of leadership at this level; and with greater oversight of the workstreams, enabling them to trouble-shoot problems arising and provide a preliminary strategy for addressing them (or raising to Sherpa level as required).

**Action:** The co-convener’s role should also be reinforced, with a clear focus on coordination and leadership of inclusive efforts (i.e. across all signatory groups) to achieve the commitments within the respective thematic areas, and a commitment from the signatory institution acting as co-convener to provide the necessary sustained and dedicated staff resources to perform this function for a reasonable period. An administrative process should also be agreed for enabling co-conveners to step down from the role and pass on the responsibility to other signatories as necessary/desired.

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2 At the High Level Meeting of select Sherpas called by the Eminent Person in September 2018, the Netherlands and ICRC agreed to follow up on a discussion on risk-sharing, specifically to identify the substantial political issues involved and to propose to the Eminent Person some ways forward.
**Action:** The capacity of the Secretariat should be significantly increased (i.e. with an increase in staffing levels) to better support the work of the FG, co-conveners and signatories. As a priority, additional staffing in the Secretariat is necessary to increase communication across the workstreams; helping the FG to trouble-shoot problems within and across workstreams; and ensuring greater sharing of information among signatories, between them and governance and leadership structures and between the collective of Grand Bargain signatories and other key stakeholders, including at country level.

### 7. Strengthen political leadership to help navigate remaining challenges and achieve success

**Action:** Building on the work of the first Eminent Person, the new incumbent should reinforce and further elaborate the original vision of the Grand Bargain, focusing the signatories on working together to realise its full potential and ensuring that it remains relevant and delivers on the original ‘bargain’. With reference to Recommendations 1 and 3, the new Eminent Person should lead the signatories in adopting a more iterative approach to achieving the original goals – an approach that capitalises on the organic evolution of the framework thus far, that is informed by an analysis of changes in the wider geopolitical environment and that acknowledges the realities of a multilateral initiative of this kind and the need to respond to a diversity of opinions, capacities and interests. Thereafter, the new Eminent Person will also need to build on the targeted engagement of the first Eminent Person to galvanise action at the highest political levels on key substantive issues, including making greater progress on enhancing the flexibility and predictability of humanitarian funding and addressing the challenges posed by donor compliance requirements.

**Action:** A core group of Sherpas, specifically those who have time and patience to dedicate to the role, and who represent different workstreams and constituent groups, should be established to drive progress against the strategy outlined above (see Recommendation 1). Working on the basis of a clear division of labour between, and in close coordination with, the new Eminent Person, this group should aim to reinforce her efforts, enabling progress at different levels and across the range of issues highlighted in this report. With authority granted by the rest of the signatories, this core group should work together specifically to provide policy guidance on addressing cross-cutting issues, to support the new Eminent Person to address the political challenges that are undermining progress across multiple workstreams and to enable signatories to seize opportunities to maximise collective progress. As a particular priority, this core group should focus on ensuring a coordinated approach to integration of the humanitarian–development nexus across the Grand Bargain framework, guiding co-conveners and signatories on related policy issues and on finding pragmatic ways to navigate those obstacles which cannot be removed, and/or mitigate their impact on signatories’ efforts to achieve the commitments. Particular members of this core group may also be designated as ‘champions’, providing critical and consistent leadership on specific cross-cutting issues or workstreams that would benefit from increased political investment to unblock obstacles and drive greater progress.
The Grand Bargain in 2018

On average 68% of signatories reported actions or results against each commitment, compared to 52% in 2017

2018 68%
2017 52%

...but progress remained uneven

The number of workstreams was streamlined from 10 to 8, and 11 ‘core commitments’ drawn from the original 51

The best-performing workstreams were:

- Workstream 2: More support and funding for local and national responders
- Workstream 3: Increase the use and coordination of cash
- Workstream 9: Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements

78% donors reported maintaining or increasing the proportion of multi-year funding...

...and more than half of all Humanitarian Response Plans are multi-year

Obstacles to greater progress are political rather than technical

Areas for action:

- Adopt a strategic approach to mitigate remaining challenges and maximise opportunities to make greater progress
- Undertake concerted high-level political dialogue aimed at navigating challenges to success
- Define more clearly what the ‘success’ of the Grand Bargain will look like
- Get the bargain back on track
- Consolidate efforts to lighten the bureaucratic burden and better support implementation of the commitments
- Empower existing governance structures to deliver
- Strengthen political leadership to help navigate remaining challenges
## Progress made per workstream

This table illustrates the scores assigned to each workstream against five assessment criteria. Overall assessments of each workstream can be found in Section 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workstream</th>
<th>Donor activity</th>
<th>Aid organisation activity</th>
<th>Activity on joint commitments</th>
<th>Links to other workstreams</th>
<th>Links to other existing processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater transparency</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>More support and funding for local and national responders</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the use and coordination of cash</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional review</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve joint and impartial needs assessments</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>A participation revolution</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced quality funding through reduced earmarking and multi-year planning and funding*</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors**</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Workstreams 7 (increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding) and 8 (reduce the earmarking of donor contributions) were merged in September 2018.

**This workstream was closed as a coordination body in March 2018.
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Cover photo: Rohingya women pump water in Balukhali refugee camp, Chittagong district, Bangladesh. © UN Women/Allison Joyce